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Resumen 
Así como el concepto de sociedad civil ha sufrido cambios a lo 
largo de las últimas décadas, la implicación de los intelectuales 
chinos también ha pasado por diferentes fases. En este artículo 
trataremos de describir las sucesivas actitudes y analizaremos 
los factores subyacentes a los cambios que han tenido lugar.  
Palabras clave 
Intelectuales, China, movimientos por los derechos civiles. 
 
Abstract 
Just as the nature of the concept has changed in the last 
decades, the involvement of the intelligentsia has also gone 
through various phases. In this chapter, we shall attempt to 
describe these successive attitudes and analyse the factors 
which underlie the changes that have taken place. 
Keywords 
Intellectuals, China, civil rights movement. 
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INTELLECTUALS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
IN THE REFORM PERIOD1  
Jean-Philippe Béja  
CNRS-CERI 
 
The concept of civil society has been introduced quite recently 
in the People’s Republic. One could state that it was intoduced 
after the reality emerged during the 1980s. Considered as 
sulfurous in the last decade of the last century because it 
reminded the communist leadership of the developments which 
had taken place in Eastern Europe and had ended up in the fall 
of the Berlin wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, it has 
become popular with liberal scholars in the early 1990s who 
used it when talking about the relations between the State and 
the citizens. After the mid-1990s, especially in the wake of the 
United Nations conference on women held near Beijing in 
1995, the official discourse started to refer to Non-
Governmental Organizations –creating the term Feizhengfu 
zhuzhi– and to the “Third Sector” (di sange bumen), 
acknowledging the necessity to develop a new kind of 
organization between the State and the citizens. The term “civil 
society” itself was not considered anti-Party any more. As it has 
become part of the “international community” newspeak, the 
Chinese leaders have understood the use they can make of these 
terms in their quest for respectability.  
However, we must face the facts and realize that the concept of 
civil society as developed by people like Adam Michnik and 
                                                 
1 Publication of this paper has been authorised by CIDOB-Barcelona Centre 
for International Affairs.  
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Václav Havel in the seventies, and the concept of NGOs 
propagated by international organizations in the nineties vastly 
differ. One was a subversive idea which shapped the legitimacy 
of the post-totalitarian regimes whereas the latter is a necessary 
tool of the “governance” which has become so fashionable in 
the present day world. 
Just as the nature of the concept has changed in the last years, 
the involvement of the intelligentsia has also gone through 
various phases. After a phase of active involvement in the 
struggle for the creation of an autonomous society between 
Deng Xiaoping’s return to power and the 1989 June 4th 
massacre, it has then retreated into silence and collaboration 
with the authorities for a little more than a decade, and has been 
active again since the beginning of the twenty first century. In 
this chapter, we shall attempt to describe these successive 
attitudes and analyse the factors which underlie the changes 
that have taken place. 
The Struggle for the Creation of an Autonomous 
Space 
 
After the trauma of Mao Zedong’s last ten years of rule, the 
return of Deng Xiaoping to power signalled a 180° change in 
the Party’s policy towards the intelligentsia. One of the first 
decisions of the new paramount leader was to rehabilitate the 
intellectuals, declaring that the former “Stinking ninth” had 
become part of the working class. This can be explained by the 
necessity for the new leadership to ground its legitimacy in the 
modernisation of the country, symbolized by the new program 
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of the “Four Modernizations”. 2  In order to achieve this 
objective, the Party needed the support of qualified staff.  
It therefore turned towards intellectuals who, having been the 
target of the recurrent political campaigns under Mao’s rule, 
were particularly demoralized as they had been persecuted and 
accused of all evils. However, despite the ostracism they had 
been submitted to, they were still anxious to play an active part 
in the struggle to achieve the old dream of a strong China (富国
梦 fuguo meng), and when Deng gave them this opportunity, 
they enthusiastically rallied behind him.  
Moreover, the new leadership needed to renew the ideological 
foundations of its right to rule. Deng showed that he really 
meant to head towards secularization, a process which 
incarnated in the struggle for the “liberation of thought” (解放
思想 jiefang sixiang) and the declaration by the then secretary 
for propaganda Hu Yaobang that “practice [was] the only 
criterion of the truth” (实践是真理的唯一标准 shijian shi 
zhengli de weyi biaozhun). This new attitude appealed to the 
intelligentsia which was given the possibility by the new 
leaders to take part in the revamping of the ideology. In the 
wake of the movement of rehabilitations of the victims of 
maoist campaigns enacted by Hu Yaobang when he headed the 
organisation department of the Central Committee, a great 
number of intellectuals re-entered the Party.3 
                                                 
2 Modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and 
technology. 
3 From 1978 to 1980 the victims of the various maoist political campaigns 
were rehabilitated : the “capitalist roaders ” of the Cultural Revolution, the 
Rightist opportunists, the Rightists and finally the partisans of Hu Feng. 
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They supported Deng Xiaoping’s policy which consisted in 
giving more autonomy to society, especially to the peasants 
who were encouraged by his lieutenants to dismantle the 
people’s communes, 4  and to open the economy to Western 
firms. Deng went even further when, in order to topple the 
Maoist leaders that the great Helmsman had appointed to 
succeed him, he allowed the discontented to vent their anger at 
the regime by pasting dazibao on the walls of the big cities.  
Many former Red Guards who had been sent to the countryside 
in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, and had come back 
illegally to the cities, wrote essays which reflected their 
criticism of the political regime and asked for “the fifth 
modernisation: “democracy”. They started unofficial journals 
where they discussed the nature of the regime which had made 
the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution possible. At the end of 
1978 and until March 1979, the Reformist leadership did not 
object to these developments (Sidane, 1980).5 
During the same period, a conference on “theoretical reflexion” 
which brought together most of the just rehabilitated 
intellectuals, was convened by Deng and met at the Great Hall 
of the People to proceed to an aggiornamento of the ideological 
foundations of the Party. Marxist-leninist theoreticians who had 
been silenced under the “Gang of Four”, former Rightists who 
had asked for more freedom in 1957, and young philosophers 
who had been active in the Tian’anmen incident discussed the 
                                                 
4  Wan Li in Anhui and Zhao Ziyang in Sichuan encouraged the 
peasants’initiatives in 1977 and became very popular: the peasants used to 
say “if you want to eat rice, ask Wan Li” (yao chi mi, zhao Wan Li), “if you 
want to eat grain, ask Zhao Ziyang” (Yao chi liang, zhao Ziyang) 
5 In November 1978, Deng Xiaoping even declared to Japanese journalists 
that the dazibao would last for decades (Sidane, 1980).  
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new political line. Some of them did not hesitate to go to the 
“Democracy Wall”, and even wrote theoretical articles in the 
unofficial journals without being criticized (Béja, 2004).6 The 
atmosphere was of a very large and free debate. But, when Wei 
Jingsheng pasted his dazibao entitled “Democracy or New 
Tyranny?” (Tansuo, 1979), which directly denounced Deng 
Xiaoping for having started the war against Vietnam without 
consulting the people, the paramount leader decided the arrests 
of the more radical activists and the quasi closure of the 
democracy walls. He then stated the “Four cardinal principles”7 
which defined the limitations to the new conquered freedom: 
criticism should not question socialism, marxism-leninism and 
Mao Zedong thought, the people’s democratic dictatorship and, 
last but not least, the leadership of the communist party. Deng 
was clearly closing the door to the possibility of installing a 
Western style democratic system in China. 
Strangely enough, the mainstream intellectuals, including the 
ones who had written in the unofficial journals, did not protest 
against the crackdown perhaps because they were not ready to 
jeopardize their newly acquired freedom by engaging in a 
radical criticicism of socialism But more deeply, they were 
suspicious of the members of the Red guard generation –who 
were overwhelmingly represented among the writers of 
dazibao– who had persecuted them during the Cultural 
Revolution. They did not want to take the chance of a return to 
Maoism to defend the freedom of expression of young radicals 
they did not trust.  
                                                 
6 Political scientist Yan Jiaqi, and legal scholar Guo Luoji.  
7 In a speech pronounced on March 31st, 1979. 
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After March 1979 the road to regime change was blocked, and 
the vast majority of intellectuals acknowledged this fact. 
However, the crackdown on the Democracy Walls made them 
understand that they could not blindly trust the new leadership, 
and led them to strive for the establishment of a sphere of 
autonomy. They understood that they could not create 
organizations in the political field, a field which the Party had 
once again expressed that it would stay under its hegemony, 
therefore they turned towards the social field. They started new 
professional associations which differed from the official mass 
organizations directly placed under the Party leadership. These 
initiatives actually played into the agenda of the Reformers who 
needed the support of society in order to complete their victory 
over the neo-Maoists and the conservatives who tried to slow 
down the pace of economic reform. The radical reformers 
represented by Deng Xiaoping’s lieutenants Hu Yaobang and 
Zhao Ziyang, needed both new ideas to enforce the economic 
and political changes necessary to the achievement of the Four 
modernizations, and forces able to help them take power from 
the whateverists8 who were still strong. 
There was therefore a convergence of interests between Party 
reformers and liberal intellectuals that allowed the latter to fight 
for the creation of a form of civil society. This experimentation 
was all the more riskless as the policies adopted in the 
countryside and in the factories –salaries have been raised 
many times from the end of the 1970s till the mid-1980s– were 
very popular and were largely supported by the “toiling 
masses”.  
                                                 
8 This is how conservatives under Wang Dongxing and Hua Guofeng were 
qualified, because they insisted that whatever Chairman Mao had said 
should be implemented. 
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As the intellectuals were careful enough not to challenge the 
legitimacy of the Party rule, they were given latitude to create 
an autonomous space. This was the Chinese version of what 
Adam Michnik has called the “self-limited revolution” 
(Micknik, 1985). As we have seen above, scholars founded 
associations such as the Beijing Association of Young 
Economists, which regrouped the more audacious specialists in 
this field. It organized conferences, discussed ideas which went 
beyond the official ideology, and represented a very dynamic 
group which enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. 
But the most creative initiative was doubtlessly the foundation 
of editorial boards: these did not challenge the Party monopoly 
on publishing but they took advantage of the new policy which 
provided that State owned enterprises should be responsible for 
their profits and losses. As these publishing houses managed by 
a Party committee had a lot of difficulty to make money, some 
of their managers therefore decided to ask famous intellectuals 
to help them publish profitable books. These managers were 
often open-minded former rightists who understood that 
controversial ideas interested the readers. This is how the 
editorial boards were borne: they were part of the publishing 
house, but their members were not selected by the department 
of organization but were chosen because they were friends who 
shared ideas and were aware of the necessity to publish ground 
breaking works in all the fields of social sciences. They were 
often themselves Party members, but the structure they worked 
in enjoyed a great degree of autonomy. The best example is the 
collection In march towards the future (走向未来 Zou xiang 
weilai) created in the Sichuan People’s Publishing House by Jin 
Guantao and the regretted Bao Zunxin.9 The influence of this 
                                                 
9  Jin Guantao left for Hong Kong in 1989 and is now publishing the 
influential magazine 二十一世纪 Ershiyi shiji, whereas Bao Zunxin was 
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collection was immense in the 1980s and many of the students 
who were to participate in the 1989 pro democracy movement 
were avid readers of its books. 
As the reforms were deepening, intellectuals became bolder and 
even created autonomous research centers. These were actually 
a new creation of the 1980s: one or two audacious intellectuals 
organized a group of friends and colleagues who shared their 
ideas to do some research on social and economic problems. 
They sold their reports to various administrations whose leaders 
needed new ideas. The research centre was registered under an 
official work unit (挂靠单位 gukao danwei) (Béja, 2004). The 
most famous is the Beijing Social and Economic Research 
Institute founded by two participants in the 1979 Democracy 
wall, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, which had a membership 
of several dozens of researchers and had direct relations with 
many ministries. At the end of the 1980s, they even bought a 
weekly paper which had been the organ of the Beijing 
association of young economists (Goldman, 2005). 
Another example is the case of the Shijie Jingji daobao (世界
经济导报 ), which was created under the auspices of the 
Research Center on the World Economy of the Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences, but was actually virtually 
independent. It was one of the most popular media in the 
intelligentsia and carried many ground breaking articles on 
democracy, on the perestroika in the Soviet Union, and even on 
the advantages of multiparty democracy.  
                                                                                                        
sentenced to 7 years in jail in 1989, and stayed in Beijing. He died in 
October 2007. 
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These semi-autonomous media carried many articles written by 
scholars from the Academies of Social Sciences and social 
scientists from the various universities. 
These intellectuals were also very active in organizing 
conferences which were eagerly followed by students. They 
also participated in the creation of the salons which 
characterized the second half of the 1980s, a name modelled on 
the salons which multiplied at the eve of the French Revolution. 
In these informal structures, discussions about democracy, 
about separation of power, about the need to adapt China to the 
modern world were rife (Béja, 2004). One of the results of the 
vibrancy of this autonomous space was to de-legitimize 
Marxism-leninism, and to popularize the new Western social 
sciences theories.  
Therefore, one can say that the intelligentsia played a major 
role in the construction of a semi-autonomous space which was 
structured by all sorts of associations operating along very 
creative rules. The autonomous space enjoyed the protection of 
the radical reformers inside the Party, who were convinced that 
in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the reform, the regime 
had to enjoy the support of the most advanced forces in society. 
This is the reason why although intellectuals were careful not to 
create political organizations, the self-limited civil society they 
built did push for the democratization of the regime: it was in 
itself a factor of pluralization, and it succeeded in reduce the 
scope of the control exerted by the Party over society. The 
radical reformers supported it because they judged that this 
experimentation was worth making because it did not affect the 
workers and peasants and therefore the stability of the regime 
was not threatened. As a matter of fact, during this first decade 
of the reforms, the rural society silently gained a large degree 
of autonomy through the de facto decollectivisation of the land 
which produced very positive effects in terms of standards of 
10 Jean-Philippe Béja 
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living and prevented contradictions to emerge in the 
countryside until The late 1990s.  
So, the advent of civil society was very much an intra-elite 
affair. However, despite the support of very highly placed Party 
leaders, it was never formally institutionalized. It operated in a 
grey zone which was protected by personal relations (guanxi), a 
sort of patron-client relationship between its actors and part of 
the Party leadership. It was a very fragile construction, as was 
demonstrated by the repression which followed the 1989 pro-
democracy movement. 
At the beginning of that movement, intellectuals were very 
cautious and did not immediately join the students in the street 
demonstrations. They were worried that any excess might 
jeopardize the autonomous space that they had had a lot of 
trouble building. But finally, they joined the movement, their 
patrons in the leadership clashed with the conservatives (Zhang, 
2001), and the paramount leader arbitrated in favour of the 
latter.  
In the wake of the Tian’anmen massacre, the organizations that 
had structured the budding civil society were dismantled, their 
animators were either jailed or exiled, and the autonomous 
space disappeared. Editorial boards were dismantled, semi-
autonomous media were closed, autonomous research centres 
were destroyed and their leaders jailed. In 1989, pro-democracy 
intellectuals learned the prize of the absence of 
institutionalization and of counting on guanxi. In a just few 
days, their protectors were purged and replaced by much more 
conservative leaders who did not share their predecessors ideas 
about the necessity of a vibrant civil society. The Party decided 
to re-instate its hegemony over the political and the societal 
fields. 
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Retreat from Civil Society: The Intelligentsia 
Supports the Party Modernisation Plan 
 
In the wake of the Tian’anmen massacre, the semi-autonomous 
organisations which had characterized the 1980s were 
persecuted, and the anti-intellectualism that had characterised 
the Maoist period came back in force. Denunciations of the 
attempts to engineer a “peaceful evolution” –towards 
capitalism–, of the alliance between the pro-democratic 
intelligentsia and the international forces of opposition were 
omnipresent. All the more so as in less than half a year after 
June 4th, all the communist regimes of Eastern Europe had 
fallen. The demise of the Soviet Union two years later sent a 
wave of panic among China’s communist leadership. The 
lessons that Deng Xiaoping drew from this string of events was 
different from those of the conservative leaders. Having 
understood that they were the result of the failure of the Eastern 
European and Soviet communist Parties to raise the standards 
of living of the population, Deng Xiaoping decided that the 
return to ideology and socialist orthodoxy favored by the 
conservatives could not help the CCP stay in power. In the 
winter of 1992, during a journey to the South of the country 
famous for its special economic zones that Communist 
conservatives had ceaselessly criticized as modern-day 
concessions, he proposed a new deal to the elites: under the 
slogan development above all (发展是硬道理 fazhan shi ying 
daoli) he meant that all sorts of experimentations were possible 
in the economic field. This was a golden opportunity for 
intellectual elites as the new phase of economic development 
was to be grounded in high technology and sophisticated 
services. And the Party was ready to give them material 
rewards if they accepted this deal. This was a considerable 
difference with the situation in the eighties: then, they had been 
rehabilitated symbolically, but their material conditions had 
12 Jean-Philippe Béja 
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remained pretty low and at the end of the decade, ambitious 
young women would rather marry a getihu (个体户) than a 
university professor. In 1992, Deng accepted to grant them 
opportunities to dramatically improve their lots and to join the 
international scientific community: professors and scholars 
would be allowed to write in international scientific journals     
–even in the field of social sciences–to do research and teach 
abroad, to invite foreign specialists to teach in Chinese 
universities. All this under one condition: that they do not 
question the legitimacy of the communist rule, or try to create 
autonomous organizations. The CP leadership also reminded 
them that the demise of the Soviet Union had been caused by 
the so-called “democratization” started by Gorbachev and 
supported by the liberal intelligentsia. Did the intellectuals want 
China to follow the example of the USSR? The CCP insisted 
that the risk of a break-up of the middle Kingdom was all the 
more present that the new phase of the reforms was going to 
affect the interests of the “toiling masses” as in order to 
modernize the economy, the government should make State 
owned enterprises efficient and profitable, a task which could 
not be achieved by preserving the workers’ “iron rice bowl”. 
The intelligentsia had to be careful not to criticize the regime 
unless the developments of the country were compromised. 
Therefore, the Party asked it to accept the new line: “stability 
overrules everything” (稳定压倒一切 wending yadao yiqie). 
A great number of Chinese intellectuals were actually 
convinced that the Soviet Union had indeed broken up because 
democratization had ended in the weakening of the State. 
Therefore, many came to share the Party’s view that 
democratization was a dangerous path which could disrupt 
modernization. So, for the decade to come, they concentrated 
on their professional achievements, developed their competence 
in sciences, and abandoned the struggle for the development of 
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an autonomous space. Many also “jumped into the sea” of 
business (下海 xia hai) and justified their attitude by an 
analysis of the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement 
which went as follows: the movement failed because the 
budding civil society could not depend on an autonomous 
economic foundation as most of its creators were employed by 
the State. By developing an autonomous market, the new policy 
could create the conditions for really autonomous organizations 
to emerge. Under these circumstances, the duty of the 
intellectuals was to work with the Party to develop the 
economy. They should accept to help the leadership devise the 
new policies, by participating in the various committees that 
were being founded by the Party and governments at every 
level, thereby returning to the old tradition of the “Counsellor 
to the Prince” so present in the intelligentsia. They were all the 
more convinced that they had to pursue these strategies as they 
shared the leadership’s conviction that protests by the working 
people represented a real danger: because they considered that 
the quality of the workers, their level of education were too low 
(素质太低 suzhi tai di), they thought that their protests would 
prevent the deepening of the reform of the economic system, 
and that they might favour the return of Maoism. In the mid-
1990s, the majority of the intellectual elites had rallied the 
regime. 
And in fact, as they had feared, the lower classes started to 
express their discontent at the new policy. Whereas during the 
late seventies and the eighties most criticisms had been 
expressed by intellectuals, students and reformist Party cadres, 
since Deng Xiaoping’s trip to the South, people belonging to 
the social strata which did not benefit from the reforms became 
increasingly vocal. They started to protest against the relative 
degradation of their social status and standards of living. And 
whereas in the first half of the 1980s, the working people’s 
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status had considerably improved, after 1992, things started to 
change: State-owned enterprises workers were sacked in great 
numbers, their status as xiagang (下岗) making them a new 
underclass, peasants living near the cities were expelled from 
their land without adequate compensation to make way for 
industrial parks or real estate projects the benefits of which 
lined the pockets the local leaders, ordinary citizens saw their 
health degraded as a result of industrial projects which did not 
take into account the damage done to the environment, an so on. 
During this phase of modernization which started in the early 
1990s and still goes on, great numbers of workers and peasants’ 
status and way of life have been affected. In the absence of 
institutionalized channels for the expression of discontent, 
petitions, collective actions, suicides multiplied. Officials at the 
local level (乡 xiang) especially were denounced for corruption, 
absolutism, and violent explosions of discontent multiplied, 
peaking in episodes which shocked the country in the early 
twenty first century, such as the Dongzhou demonstrations10 
(Shanwei, Guangdong) in 2005, the Taishi affair in 2004, 
which became icons for a new social movement.  
In the beginning, protests by the lower classes were ignored by 
the elites, except for a very small group of pro-democracy 
fighters who wrote petitions in support of the mingong (民工) 
or tried to help organize disgruntled workers and met with 
tough repression from the authorities (Béja, 1975: 29). 
As the opposition forces had not yet recovered from the 
repression which had followed the Tian’anmen massacre, and 
since the majority of the intelligentsia adhered to the Party’s 
program, these protests went mostly ignored. They remained 
                                                 
10 New York Times, 13/12/05. 
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strictly circumscribed to villages, and danwei. As the protesters 
were deprived of access to the international media, as Chinese 
journalists were under strong pressure to submit to the 
authorities’ orders, they did not have much impact on the 
general political situation. 
However, the development of inequalities which accompanied 
economic growth, provoking a disenfranchisement of 
increasing numbers of citizens, started to worry the leadership. 
Because, since 1989, the Party legitimacy had been exclusively 
based on its capacity to develop the economy and to raise the 
people’s standards of living, this phenomenon was increasingly 
perceived as a threat to the sacrosanct “stability”. The 
discontent engendered by the relative impoverishment of vast 
stretches of urban and rural society risked to lead to violence 
which might become a challenge to Party rule. Abuses by local 
cadres, running away corruption, the fall of moral standards 
among the ruling groups were slowly undermining the Party 
legitimacy. The leadership felt it had to react to check that 
worrying trend. 
It was nevertheless out of the question to allow the discontented 
groups to organize and express their grievances. Whoever is at 
the helm of the Communist Party, the prohibition to allow the 
creation of autonomous social or political organizations is a 
basic principle that cannot be infringed.  
The Emphasis on the Law by the CCP Leadership 
Under these constraints, and for other reasons that we shall 
envisage below, the Party leadership decided to emphasize the 
importance of the law: developing the concept that had been 
raised in the 1980s of “democracy and legality (民主与法制 
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minzhu yu fazhi)” they affirmed the necessity to “rule the 
country according to the law” (yifa zhiguo 依法治国).11 This 
decision was made in a peculiar international context: as the 
boycott which had followed the Tian’anmen massacre was 
eased, and as relations with the Western world and especially 
the USA were dramatically improving, China signed the 
International Covenants on Economic, Cultural and Social 
Rights, and on Civil and Political Rights –which it has not 
ratified– in 1997 and 1998. This undoubtedly helped the PRC 
to join the WTO in November 2001.  
Of course, the fact that the term “Rule of Law” entered official 
discourse did not mean that the system had changed. Neither 
did the fact that the Constitution was once more amended in 
2004, under the reign of Hu Jintao, to integrate the “protection 
of human rights” and “protection of private property”. Actually, 
the leadership has always had an instrumental conception of the 
law. It is supposed to help resolve the contradiction, but should 
not undermine the power of the Party. Therefore, the 
amendments did not deeply change the relations between the 
State and society. Besides, they were not such a novelty as the 
litigation law, which allowed citizens to sue the State agencies, 
had been adopted in 1989.  
The Return of the Intelligentsia in the Fight for a 
Civil Society: The Civil Rights Movement 
The novelty is not so much the fact that the authorities have 
emphasized the importance of “the rule of Law”, but that since 
the beginning of the 21st century, ordinary citizens have started 
to pay attention to that question and have taken the authorities 
                                                 
11 This phrase was introduced as an amendment to the Constitution in 1999 
by the NPC. 
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to their word, and used the discourse of the law to defend their 
rights and to protest against the abuses of the cadres.  
The recourse to the discourse of the law does not necessarily 
mean that aggrieved citizens take their grievances to the courts. 
This can be the case, but it is not the only way for them to 
demand the enforcement of the law. The “civil rights 
movement” (维权运动 weiquan yundong) which has appeared 
in China especially since the accession of Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao to the supreme leadership, has taken various forms: 
class-action in court –especially in the case of violation of 
consumer rights–, individual suit, demonstrations, petitions,  
collective letters, shangfang, and so on. 
But all these actions are meant to obtain that the authorities 
implement the laws they have adopted and live up to their 
discourse. We shall see below that the aggrieved citizens do not 
always believe that the government feels obliged to behave 
legally, but using that discourse gives citizens’ action an 
undeniable legitimacy. This type of action is quite new in China, 
but one could argue that it represents an actualization of a 
widespread behavior in the 1960s: during the Cultural 
Revolution, minority groups members often used “quotations 
from Chairman Mao” to oppose the decisions of the leading 
factions. This attitude was then condemned as “waiving the 
Red Flag to fight the Red Flag” (举红旗反红旗 ). If one 
considers that at the time, Mao’s words were the equivalent of 
the Law, this behavior is not so different from the Civil Rights 
Movement activists’. But it is also typical of political attitudes 
of citizens in socialist countries, best described by then Czech 
dissident Václav Havel: 
A persistent and never-ending appeal to the laws –not just 
to the laws concerning human rights, but to all laws– does 
not mean at all that those who do so have succumbed to the 
18 Jean-Philippe Béja 
Inter Asia Papers ISSN 2013-1747 nº34/2013 
illusion that in our system the law is anything other than 
what it is. They are well aware of the role it plays. But 
precisely because they know how desperately the system 
depends on it –on the 'noble' version of the law, that is– 
they also know how enormously significant such appeals 
are. Because the system cannot do without the law, because 
it is hopelessly tied down by the necessity of pretending the 
laws are observed, it is compelled to react in some way to 
such appeals (Havel, 1991).12  
The Chinese lawyers and legal scholars who support the 
aggrieved citizens’ cause call this attitude taking the fraud at its 
own word (假戏真常  jiaxi zhenchang).13  As Václav Havel 
shows, it does put an undeniable pressure on the authorities and 
gives a certain margin of maneuver to the victims of abuses.  
The best example was the Sun Zhigang affair in 2003. This was 
the case which symbolized the advent of the Civil Rights 
Movement14 in the public sphere. A very special conjunction of 
factors gave it great prominence, but it already concentrated all 
the aspects of the movement: 
                                                 
12 I am indebted to Perry Link for finding this quotation by the famous 
Czech dissident. 
13 This translation is Perry Link’s. This behavior is quite common in more 
generally in authoritarian systems where citizens are not allowed to question 
the legitimacy of the official discourse. 
14 The expression weiquan yundong is usually translated as “Rights Defense 
Movement”, which is in effect its literal meaning. However, its goal is really 
to enforce civil rights for all Chinese citizens, and many of its aspects 
remind the observer of the American Civil Rights Movement. Therefore, we 
have decided to use this translation. 
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- The role of the media: The death of Sun Zhigang15 was 
first reported in Nanfang dushi bao, whose reporter 
went to investigate the case by himself and showed that 
Sun’s detention was illegal and violated the rules 
governing the functioning of the Custody and 
Repatriation Centers (Thireau and Hua, 2005). The 
article referred to the specific articles of the law to 
justify its denunciation of the authorities’ behavior. The 
article was then re-published by another newspaper. 
- Censorship by the authorities: The Guangdong Party 
Committee ordered the newspapers not to cover that 
story. The journalists obeyed, but it was already too 
late. 
- The role of the Internet: a great number of infuriated 
comments had already appeared on the Internet and they 
did not cease with the Party’s reaction. The Sun 
Zhigang affair had already become a national “cause 
célèbre”. It provoked a string of discussions on the 
equal rights of migrants and residents, prompting some 
migrant workers to declare: “We are all Chinese, and 
some Chinese have beaten another Chinese to death” 
(Lee, 2003). 
- The role of the legal community: Legal scholars then 
seized this case and three of them sent a letter to the 
NPC asking for the abolition of the Centers. Their 
reaction was based on the law (立法法 lifa fa) passed in 
                                                 
15 This case is quite famous so we won’t go into details. Let’s just recall that 
Sun Zhigang, a designer from Hubei, was sent to a Custody and Repatriation 
Camp because he did not carry his provisional hukou. Although he had 
proposed to ask friends to go and fetch it, he was beaten to death.  
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2000 which allowed citizens to propose the abolition of 
laws and regulations that they deemed unconstitutional  
One of the authors of the letter, Xu Zhiyong, a Law 
professor at the Chinese University of 
Telecommunications declared: “The Constitution says 
that all people are equal before the law. But because of 
the disparities in our society, rural people are heavily 
discriminated against and their freedoms are restricted" 
(Ekholm, 2003). The legal scholars’ objective was 
actually to use the Constitution as an effective guarantee 
of the citizens’ rights. 
- Finally, to the utter surprise of the signatories, on June 
18th 2003, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao decided to 
abolish the Custody and Repatriation Centers. Later, 
agents who had beaten Sun to death were sentenced to 
heavy jail terms and two to the death penalty (Jakes, 
2003). 
Legal scholars were a bit disappointed because the abolition 
was the result of a political decision and not of a legal process; 
nevertheless, this was viewed as the first victory of public 
opinion since 1989: by challenging the legality of a well 
established institution, legal scholars, helped by journalists who 
had denounced the scandal, and supported by public opinion on 
the internet, had succeeded in moving the government to take 
the decision they were asking.  
After that episode, many legal scholars, lawyers and citizens 
alike were convinced that the law could be used to defend the 
rights of ordinary Chinese and that they had a responsibility to 
take part in this struggle. These new developments have 
signalled the return of part of the intelligentsia to the side of 
society, and to the struggle for the defense of the citizens’rights. 
After a decade of intense collaboration with the Party 
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leadership characterized by a fear of working people 
involvement in the public sphere, many intellectuals were 
convinced that to make China stable, it was necessary to have 
equal rights for all its citizens. They therefore joined the 
struggle for the implementation of civil rights launched by 
ordinary citizens. 
Since the turn of the century, many victims of abuse –villagers 
insufficiently compensated after land expropriation, peasants 
victims of corrupt Party secretaries, urban residents expelled 
from their homes to give way to developpers– started to 
denounce the cadres’ behavior by referring to their rights as 
guaranteed by the Constitution. With the help of journalists, of 
ordinary netizens, a network of lawyers and legal scholars 
specializing in rights defence appeared, and is now considered 
as a tool to challenge abusive cadres. This network is informal, 
but it covers the entire country. It is very different from the 
organizations of the type that intellectuals had created in the 
1980s (Béja, 2004), but thanks to the Internet, and the new 
modes of communication –SMS, e-mails, and so on– it can be 
relatively easy mobilized by people who fall victims to official 
bullies.  
The Taishi Affair 
A good example is the Taishi affair. When the villagers in 
Taishi (Guangdong) discovered that their village chief had 
embezzled land compensation funds, 400 of them deposed a 
petition to ask for his recall in accordance with the organic law 
on village elections. They had asked the advice of a Zhongshan 
University Professor famous for her involvement in the Civil 
rights movement, and a legal scholar from Guangzhou, Guo 
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Feixiong. 16  Two weeks later, 1.500 villagers clashed with 
armed police and activists were arrested. They then started a 
hunger strike to protest, and despite the refusal of the village 
chief to resign, they stuck to non-violent means. Li Fan, a 
scholar who runs a centre which studies democracy at the 
village level, described the originality of the movement: “The 
dismissal request is not strange”, he said. “What it is strange is 
the methods the villagers used. They understand the law and 
attracted foreign media and academic interest, which made the 
matter more complicated” (Lee, 2005). Lawyers and legal 
scholars came to help the villagers, and the Taishi affair 
became another symbol of the citizens’ new behavior.   
An interesting aspect of the weiquan network is that it cuts 
across social classes, allowing for collaboration between 
intellectuals –such as lawyers, journalists, academics– and 
workers and peasants. It is different from the traditional forms 
of dissent and opposition in the PRC. Whereas during the 
eighties, criticism of the Party came mostly from intellectuals 
and students who had extensive contacts with factions inside 
the apparatus and were pushing for the reform of the political 
system, the Civil Rights Movement originates in ordinary 
citizens who do not question the Party political line or the 
nature of the regime, but openly and decidedly posit themselves 
within the system, and try to solve concrete problems through 
official channels. Their demands are very different form their 
predecessors’. For example, they don’t ask for “freedom and 
democracy”, nor do they denounce corruption in general. This 
new attitude is certainly a result of the repression of the 1989 
pro-democracy movement. 
                                                 
16 Guo Feixiong was sentenced to five years in jail for “corruption ” in 
November 2007. 
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Many of the scholars and journalists who constitute the bulk of 
the activists of the weiquan yundong were very young during 
the 1989 pro-democracy movement but it impressed them 
strongly. In private, many of them acknowledge their debt to 
the students, but they also emphasize their differences. Let’s 
see how Xu Zhiyong, one of the activists in the Sun Zhigang 
affair, describes his relations to previous movements: “I have 
respect for those who raised human rights issues in the past”, he 
said. “But now we hope to work in a constructive way within 
the space afforded by the legal system. Concrete but gradual 
change -I think that's what most Chinese people want” (Ekholm, 
2003). 
The fact is that most of the citizens who are part of this 
movement care mainly about the redress of their grievances, 
and do not pose a political challenge to the regime. On the 
contrary, they demand that it takes steps to solve the 
dysfunctions of the system.  
In the early days of the weiquan movement, the authorities 
encouraged the victims of abuse to seek redress in courts, rather 
than use the traditional channels such as the xinfang ju. They 
thought that it was a positive development which demonstrated 
the people’s trust in the regime:  
“By applying proper legal procedures to the request of a 
person aggrieved by an administrative decision, the courts 
may dissipate resentment and discontent through providing 
more effective remedies than the traditional way of 
shangfang (上访) or laifang-laixin (来访来信), that is, by 
making complaints and appeals for help by the higher 
authorities by making visits or sending letters. In other words: 
The frustration reflected in the saying that “for officials to 
sue the people is just and normal, but there is no effective 
way for the people to sue the officials” (官告民一个准,民告
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官没有门 guan gao min yige zhun, min gao guan meiyou 
men) could be reduced” (Yu, 1987).  
In the early 2000s, the term weiquan was actually used in 
official language. A search for the term on the Chinese 
government’s website gave tens of thousands of references and 
was described positively. For example: “General rights defense 
knowledge ( 为全常识 weiquan changshi) understanding 
enables citizens to take preventive measures against rights 
infringement”.17 
This convergence between citizens’ behavior and government 
discourse helps explain why in late 2002 and early 2003, not 
only ordinary citizens, but also intellectuals concerned with 
right defense were optimistic about the attitude of the new 
leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao would help enforce 
equal rights for all citizens. All the more so as they proclaimed 
their interest in the lot of the “vulnerable groups”. 
For a few months, it seemed that the authorities had understood 
that it was very dangerous to deny the victims the right to go to 
court as conflicts multiplied and tended to escalate18 –in the 
cities as much as in the countryside–, threatening to become 
violent and therefore to put the sacrosanct stability in jeopardy. 
It then seemed that the Party leaders had understood that the 
fact that Civil Rights activists did not challenge the legitimacy 
of the State but, on the contrary, took it to its word and 
                                                 
17 See “Weiquan on Line”, China Rights Forum, 3, 2006, p.19. 
18 In 2005, the official press announced that there had been 87.000 collective 
incidents, against 78.000 in 2004 and only 32.000 in 1999 and 8.700 in 1993. 
Quoted in Terence Chen “Weiquan, the Chinese People Rise Up to Defend 
Their Rights”,<http://chinascope.org/magazine/200510/3>, accessed on 
September 5th, 2007.   
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demanded that, in order to reinforce its legitimacy, the new 
team emphasize the enforcement of the law. Hope was so great 
that many intellectuals talked about Hu-Wen’s new deal (新政
xinzheng)   
Alas, these hopes were soon going to be disappointed, because 
un the following years, the Party toke numerous measures to 
curb the Civil Rights Movement, by cracking down on its main 
actors. 
Repression by local authorities became stronger. For example, 
when Dongzhou (Shanwei, Guangdong) villagers rose in 
November 2005 to protest against inadequate compensation for 
land seizures, the armed police used firearms to quell the 
demonstration and arrested the leaders (Magnier, 2005, 2006). 
In what looked like an all-out offensive on the movement, the 
Party used a very aggressive language. Luo Gan, the member of 
the Politburo Standing Committee, declared that the Civil rights 
movement “harboured forces dedicated to overthrowing the 
Party rule”, 19  and received support from Western countries. 
According to a source quoted by CRD network, a document 
was circulated which called on officials at all levels of 
government to “initiate attacks, strike them as soon as they 
emerge, control the enemy first and eliminate the situation that 
is sprouting.”20 
Is it a result of these decisions? The fact is that in the last two 
years, the courts, acting in accordance with local governments, 
                                                 
19 “Chinese official urges local handling of unrest”, International Herald 
Tribune, January 8, 2007. 
20 <http://crdnet.org/Article/Class9/Class11/200705/20070504163559_4198.
html>. 
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have condemned legal activists and lawyers who had played an 
important role in prominent weiquan cases.21 
Furthermore in 2006 the NPC passed a law providing for “New 
Guidelines on Lawyers” which restrict even further their 
independence and their ability to defend the victims of abuses 
as, for example, they explicitly state that “Lawyers who handle 
mass cases should accept supervision and guidance by judicial 
administration departments”.22 As lawyers have to renew their 
licenses every year, it is easy to prevent those specializing in 
the defense of Civil rights to practice. This is what happened to 
Gao Zhisheng in December 2005, to Li Jianqiang in Shandong 
in July 2007 and to other lawyers in Shaanxi.23 
Continuing the crackdown on the Civil rights Movement, the 
Central and Provincial Departments of Propaganda ordered the 
media not to cover conflicts in rural or urban areas without 
prior official authorization. Many journalists were either 
arrested or silenced, editorial boards were restructured, netizens 
arrested and sentenced to heavy jail terms, some books were 
banned (Béja, 2007). 
Of course, enforcing control is not as easy as it was in Mao’s 
times, and a lot of information about conflicts is still available 
                                                 
21  See for example the case of Chen Guangcheng who protested forced 
abortions in Linyi, Shandong, Zheng Enchong, condemned in Shanghai for 
having helped evicted residents, Guo Feixiong, active in both Taishi, 
Dongzhou and Linyi who were sentenced to prison terms.  See Human 
Rights Watch, A Great Danger for Lawyers, 
<http://hrw.org/reports/2006/china1206/>. 
22 ibid. 
23  See “China Rights Defense” website, <http://crd-
net.org/Article/Class9/Class10/Index.html>. 
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on the net. Even open letters, such as the one initiated by 
dissident writer Liu Xiaobo, “One world, One Dream, and 
Universal Human Rights”, circulate on the net and was signed 
by Chinese citizens. Another example, a laid off worker in 
Heilongjiang was arrested and charged with subversion of the 
State, because he had circulated a letter entitled “We Want 
Human Rights, not the Olympics”24 which was signed by more 
than 1.000 citizens. 
Despite these continued instances of dissent, the crackdown has 
been quite efficient, and the Civil rights movement lost in 
intensity at the approach of the 17th Party Congress. These 
developments show that Hu Jintao did not opt for a relaxation 
of control. Although the expression of dissent toke new forms, 
although it decided to remain confined within the framework of 
the law, the Secretary General confirmed that only the Party has 
the right to solve contradictions which emerged “between the 
cadres and the masses”. Be it demonstrations –the authorities 
always react negatively to the demands for demonstrations–, or 
public opinion campaigns to demand the enforcement of basic 
rights, as long as these initiatives are taken without the 
authorization of the officials, they are considered suspect. The 
authorities have taken many steps to improve the lot of the 
workers and peasants who do not gain in the reform process. 
The government has amended the Labor Law and the situation 
of the mingong –one of the most “vulnerable groups” in 
Chinese society as they very often work without any contract, 
and therefore without any protection from the State– has 
improved. The government has also taken steps to fight against 
the embezzlement of compensation funds for the land that local 
authorities decide to develop. 
                                                 
24 “Chinese Human Rights Defenders”, CRD network, September 3rd, 2007, 
<http://crd-net.org/Article/ShowClass.asp?ClassID=9>. 
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But at the same time, the Party has taken all the possible steps 
to curb the independent activities of citizens, and to prevent a 
category of Civil Rights activists to crystallize and become an 
autonomous force.  
The 17th Congress did not fundamentally change this situation 
as it involves the deep nature of the political system. It is not a 
question of faction politics. As long as Hu Jintao does not start 
a profound reform of the Communist Party rule, prompting it to 
recognize the legitimacy of citizens’ autonomous action, the 
discontented who try to express their dissent openly is subject 
to repression. The Party line can go through more relaxed (放
fang) or more tense (收 shou) periods according to the balance 
of forces between factions, but it is very difficult to imagine 
that the weiquan movement will be institutionalized during 
Hu’s term. However, as social conflict is bound to continue, 
there will be clashes between citizens and officials during the 
future. If repression of the weiquan activists continues, 
aggrieved citizens might well become desperate and lost their 
faith in the system. Unable to obtain satisfaction before the 
courts, they might resort to violence. What will be the attitude 
of the intelligentsia? Will it fear that the protests by ordinary 
citizens threaten the development of the country, which remains 
an important objective? Will part of the intellectuals be 
discouraged by the impossibility for citizens to express their 
needs within the bound of the system? Will they continue to 
help social movements find legal outlet? The crackdown on the 
rights defenders has shown intellectuals that getting involved 
with ordinary citizens can be dangerous. It is hard to tell 
whether they will continue to try to find ways to obtain a 
relaxation of control by the Party, and an institutionalization of 
civil rights or will rally the elites and lend their support to the 
leadership. 
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